

COMS BC3262: Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 15: Discrete Log, CDH, and DDH

BARNARD COLLEGE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Office Hours

Office hours:

- **Eysa:** Mondays 3-5, Milstein 512
- **Mark:** Tuesdays 6:30-8:30, Milstein 503

This week there may be an extra review session on Friday to review topics from the first half of the course (tentatively 2pm, location TBD)

- Completely optional but highly recommended for anyone who feels iffy on anything we covered before spring break
- Hosted by one of last semester's intro crypto TAs

Today's Lecture

- Cyclic Groups
- Discrete Log Assumption
- Collision-resistant hash functions from DL

Cyclic Groups

Cyclic Groups

Definition: Let \mathbb{G} be a finite group of order m and let $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Then

- $\langle g \rangle = \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots\}$
- The order of g (denoted $\text{ord}(g)$) is the smallest $0 < i \leq m$ such that $g^i = 1$

Facts:

- $\langle g \rangle$ is a subgroup of \mathbb{G} (called “the subgroup generated by g ”)
- $\langle g \rangle = \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^{\text{ord}(g)-1}\}$
- $g^x = g^y$ if and only if $x = y \pmod m$
- The order of g divides the order of \mathbb{G} , i.e., $\text{ord}(g) \mid m$

Cyclic Groups

Example: $\mathbb{Z}_{15}^* = \{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}$, $|\mathbb{Z}_{15}^*| = 8$

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Cyclic Groups

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- $\langle 2 \rangle = \{1, 2, 4, 8\}$

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- $\langle 11 \rangle =$

Cyclic Groups

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- $\langle 2 \rangle = \{1, 2, 4, 8\}$
- $\langle 7 \rangle = \{1, 7, 4, 13\}$
- $\langle 4 \rangle = \{1, 4\}$
- $\langle 11 \rangle = \{1, 11\}$

Cyclic Groups

Definition: A group \mathbb{G} is **cyclic** if there exists $g \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$. In this case, g is called a **generator** of the group

- $(\mathbb{Z}_N, +)$ is cyclic with generator 1

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- $(\mathbb{Z}_N, +)$ is cyclic with generator 1

Theorem: A group \mathbb{G} with prime order is cyclic and every $g \in \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$ is a generator

Theorem: If p is prime then (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) is cyclic

- Note: \mathbb{Z}_p^* is *not* a prime order group (unless $p = 3$) since $p - 1$ isn't prime. Not every element in $\mathbb{Z}_p^* \setminus \{1\}$ is necessarily a generator either.

Cyclic Groups

Theorem: There is an efficient randomized algorithm that on input 1^n outputs a random n -bit prime p , together with a random generator $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

We will not go over the proof for this, but it is worth knowing that there is an efficient algorithm for sampling a cyclic group and generator

Cyclic Groups

Consider (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) for a prime p . This is a cyclic group for some g :

$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$$

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Note that this group is **isomorphic** to $(\mathbb{Z}_{p-1}, +)$

- Can define bijection $f: \mathbb{Z}_{p-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as $f(x) = g^x \pmod p$ (for a generator g)
 - $f(0) = g^0 = g^{p-1} = 1 \pmod p$
 - $f(1) = g^1, \dots$

Cyclic Groups

Claim: Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of order m , and let g be a generator. Then the mapping $f : \mathbb{Z}_m \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ defined by $f(x) = g^x$ is an isomorphism

Cyclic Groups

Mathematically (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) and $(\mathbb{Z}_{p-1}, +)$ are the same. But computationally they're not necessarily!

- While $f(x) = g^x \bmod p$ is efficiently computable, the inverse f^{-1} is believed not to be!
- This is known as the “Discrete log assumption” (DLA) for \mathbb{Z}_p^*
 - Note that this is an *assumption*
 - For some groups we believe this to be true, for others we don't


Discrete Log Assumption

The Discrete Logarithm Assumption

- Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of order q (i.e., $|G| = q$) and let g be a generator
 - In other words, $\mathbb{G} = \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^{q-1}\}$
- For every $h \in \mathbb{G}$ there exists $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $h = g^x$
 - x is called the **discrete log** of h with respect to g

The Discrete Logarithm Assumption

Let \mathcal{G} be a PPT algorithm that on input 1^n outputs (\mathbb{G}, q, g) , where \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order q that is generated by g .



$$\text{DLA}_{A, \mathcal{G}}(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & g^x = h \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


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Definition:

The **Discrete Log Assumption** holds with respect to \mathcal{G} if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{DLA}_{A, \mathcal{G}}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$$



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The Discrete Logarithm Assumption


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The **Discrete Log Assumption** holds **with respect to \mathcal{G}** if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$\Pr[\text{DL}$

Why is this defined “with respect to \mathcal{G} ”?



$$\text{DLA}_{A, \mathcal{G}}(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & g^x = h \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The Discrete Logarithm Assumption

Do we think this assumption hold for all groups?

Example: Consider the (multiplicative) group $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^* = \langle 2 \rangle$

- What is the discrete log of 11 with respect to 2?
 - That is, find x such that $2^x = 11 \pmod{13}$?

Example: Consider the (additive) group $\mathbb{Z}_{13} = \langle 1 \rangle$

- What is the discrete log of 11 with respect to 1?

The Discrete Logarithm Assumption

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
- What is the discrete log of 11 with respect to 1?

Notice that computing discrete log is easy in certain groups!

CRHF from DL

Recall: CRHF Security

Given $\Phi = (\text{Gen}, H)$ and an adversary A , consider the experiment $\text{HashColl}_{\Phi, A}(n)$:



$$\text{HashColl}_{\Phi, A}(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & H^s(x) = H^s(x') \text{ and } x \neq x' \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

CRHF based on DLA

Given \mathcal{G} , construct $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, H)$ as follows:

- **Key generation:** On input 1^n , run $(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ and sample $h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$. Output the seed as $s = (\mathbb{G}, q, g, h)$.
- **Evaluation:** On input s and $x = (x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$, output $g^{x_1}h^{x_2} \in \mathbb{G}$


Theorem: If the discrete log assumption holds relative to \mathcal{G} , then Π is collision-resistant.

Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement/ Key Exchange

Key Agreement (KA)/Key Exchange (KE)

Alice and Bob don't have an existing shared secret key.

Can they communicate over a public channel to agree on a secret key?



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



$$(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$$

$$x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_a = g^x$$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



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$$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_b = g^y$$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



$$(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$$

$$x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_a = g^x$$

$$k = (h_b)^x$$

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$$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_b = g^y$$

$$h_b$$

$$k = (h_b)^x$$

$$k = (h_a)^y$$

Correctness: Both output the same k :

$$(h_b)^x = (g^y)^x = g^{xy} = (g^x)^y = (h_a)^y$$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



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$$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_b = g^y$$

$$k = (h_a)^y$$

Security: Just looking at the messages,
Eve should not be able to figure out k

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



Are we able to prove security just from the discrete log assumption?

$$(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$$

$$x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$h_a = g^x$$

$$k = (h_b)^x$$

$$(\mathbb{G}, q, g), h_a$$

$$h_b$$


$$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

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Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH)




$$\text{CDH}_{A, \mathcal{G}}(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & g^{xy} = h_3 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH)

Definition:

The **Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption** (CDH) holds with respect to \mathcal{G} if for all PPT A there exists a negligible function such that

$$\Pr[\text{CDH}_{A,\mathcal{G}}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$$



$$\text{CDH}_{A,\mathcal{G}}(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & g^{xy} = h_3 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH)

CDH is a **search** problem: It is hard to **find** g^{xy} (for uniformly distributed x, y)

DDH is a **decision** problem: It is hard to **distinguish** g^{xy} from a random group element

Definition: Decisional DH (DDH) holds with respect to \mathcal{G} if for every PPT A there exists a negligible function s.t.

$$\left| \begin{aligned} & \Pr_{(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n), x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q} [A(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] \\ & - \Pr_{(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n), x, y, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q} [A(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1] \end{aligned} \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

PRG from DDH?

Informally, DDH says given $\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y$, no PPT adversary can distinguish between g^{xy} and a random group element g^z

Can we use this to construct a PRG?

$$G(a, b) = (g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$$

I leave this as an exercise to the reader to reason about :)

DL vs CDH vs DDH

- **Discrete log assumption:** Given g^x , it is hard to find x
- **Computational DH:** Given g^x, g^y , it is hard to find g^{xy}
- **Decisional DH:** Given g^x, g^y, h , it is hard to tell if $h = g^{xy}$ or if h is random

What are the relationships between each of these assumptions?

Do certain assumptions imply others?

DL vs CDH vs DDH

- **Discrete log assumption:** Given g^x , it is hard to find x
- **Computational DH:** Given g^x, g^y , it is hard to find g^{xy}
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$$\text{DDH} \implies \text{CDH} \implies \text{DL}$$